Abstract-Although neural network-based classifiers outperform humans in a range of tasks, they are still prone to manipulation through adversarial perturbations. Prior research has resulted in the identification of effective defense mechanisms for many reported attack methods, however a defense against the C&W attack, as well as a holistic defense mechanism capable of countering multiple different attack methods, are still missing.
I. INTRODUCTION
State of the art neural network-based classifiers outperform humans in a wide range of tasks [31] , [33] , however they are extremely vulnerable to adversarial manipulation. Following the initial discovery of adversarial examples in deep neural networks [32] , an array of increasingly more powerful attack methods have been reported [6] , [25] . Adversarial perturbations have been refined to the point that a single pixel can control the output of a convolutional neural network (CNN) based classifier [30] , and recent research demonstrated how generic perturbations can be applied as is to a wide range of inputs and network architectures [19] .
The term adversarial transferability was coined by [23] who demonstrated that it is possible to launch an attack against a given network using perturbation patterns devised on a surrogate network. Furthermore, the applicability of adversarial examples in the real world has been shown in various studies [2] , [15] , [28] .
Naturally, significant research efforts have been invested in trying to counter such attacks, either by increasing classifier resilience [12] , [18] , [20] , [26] , [30] or attempting to differentiate adversarial examples from normal instances [9] , [11] , [29] . However, adversaries clearly have the upper hand in this evolving arms race [3] , [6] , [7] . An effective defense mechanism against the Carlini and Wagner (C&W) attack [5] [6] , as well as a holistic defense mechanism capable of countering multiple different attack methods are still lacking.
Two core principles underlie all adversarial attack methods used against deep neural networks: 1) adversarial examples should closely resemble normal input, and 2) perturbation should give the adversary complete control of the classification results. In this work, we coined the term activation spaces to refer to the hyperspaces formed by the activation values of the different network layers and propose a novel adversarial example detection method using activation spaces, leveraging the two core principles listed above.
We construct Euclidian spaces out of the activation values of each of the network's convolution layers. Then, we induce a set of k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) classifiers, one per activation space, using the non-adversarial examples. We use those classifiers to produce a sequence of class labels for each non-perturbed input sample and estimate the a priori probability for a class label change between one activation space and another. During the detection phase, we compute a sequence of classification labels for each input using the trained classifiers and then estimate the likelihood of those classification sequences, showing that sequences associated with adversarial examples are far less likely than those of normal examples.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II provides general background regarding adversarial machine learning, including state of the art methods for attack, defense, and detection. Section III presents our proposed detection method, which is empirically evaluated in Section IV. We provide final notes and future research directions in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide the background needed to understand our detection approach. We briefly explain the existing algorithms used to craft adversarial examples and discuss their effect on deep neural network-based classifiers. We then survey known defense and detection mechanisms, in order to identify the existing gaps and derive the requirements for any new detection method.
A. Crafting Adversarial Attacks
Given a neural network-based classifier (•) , an input vector , and true class label , crafting an adversarial example = ( + ) translates to identifying an adversarial perturbation such that ( ) ≠ . . ‖ ‖ < (1) where is used to ensure that the adversarial perturbation is undetectable, and is a context specific distance metric. In the context of image classification, three distance metrics are commonly used as a proxy for human perception: 1) measures the number of perturbed features (i.e., image pixels), 2) measures the perturbation's Euclidian norm, and 3) measures the maximal change to any of the input features.
Various optimization methods for solving the constraints in (1) have been suggested in recent years. Typically the methods include computation of ( ), calculation of the loss gradient, and one or more steps in which the input is perturbed based on the gradient, in order to maximize the loss.
Attack methods are often divided into two classes: targeted and non-targeted attacks. The approach described above is known as a non-targeted attack. Here the attacker wishes to deviate from the true class label but does not care which other class is chosen. In contrast, targeted attacks allow the attacker full control of the classifier's output.
The following subsections provide details about several notable attack methods and describe the effect of adversarial perturbations on the classifier network's certainty estimates.
1) Jacobian Saliency Map Attack (JSMA)
In [25] , the authors suggested a greedy iterative perturbation algorithm for targeted misclassification. In each iteration, the algorithm computes a saliency map based on the network's Jacobian and perturbs the two most salient input features. This procedure minimizes the number of perturbed features but is highly demanding in terms of computation resources, making it impractical for problems with high input dimensionality.
2) Fast Gradient Sign Method and Basic Iterative Method
The fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [10] was the first computationally efficient method for crafting adversarial examples. Using a single iteration of gradient calculation, the algorithm perturbs each of the input features by a magnitude of in the direction of the loss gradient. Formally,
where ( , ) represents the classifier's loss given an input vector and true class label . The basic iterative method (BIM) [16] is an extension of the FGSM, where instead of performing a single step in the direction of the gradient, ℎ smaller steps of size are performed so that ℎ * = . The result is a considerably refined perturbation pattern.
More recent research has presented effective countermeasures for both the FGSM and BIM [5] .
3) Carlini & Wagner (C&W) Attack
In [6] , the authors presented an attack method that can overcome most, if not all, known defense mechanisms. The C&W attack was specifically designed to overcome defensive distillation [26] , which was considered unbeatable at the time. Their work includes a set of three attack methods (one for each commonly used distance metric), all sharing the same iterative optimization method.
The authors started by rephrasing the objective function used for crafting a targeted attack. Instead of requiring that
where is the destination target class, they introduced a new objective function ( + ) so that
The original objective function presented in (3) is highly nonlinear, making it hard to solve. Using the new representation, the authors were able to construct an equivalent optimization problem that is both easier to solve and controls the tradeoff between perturbation size and the need to mislead the classifier:
The result is a powerful set of attacks for which there are no known defense or detection mechanisms.
4) False Sense of Certainty
In [21] , the authors created images that appear as random noise to a human observer but are actually carefully crafted adversarial examples. The algorithm used for creating those examples follows the concepts presented in Sections 1-3 above, however perturbation is applied to some random noise image instead of a valid image from the testing set. The researchers' main contribution was in addressing the issue of model certainty. Using a state of the art ImageNet classifier, the authors showed that model certainty does not reflect reality when processing adversarial examples. Despite being fooled, the classifier was over 99% certain that the random noise images represented a valid object category. Adversarial training is perhaps the most immediate line of defense against adversarial manipulations. It is based on iteratively training the classifier network using adversarial examples by 1) training a network to be sufficiently accurate with normal input, 2) generating adversarial examples, 3) augmenting the training input, and 4) fine-tuning the classifier.
B. Defense Mechanisms

1) Adversarial Training
This simple approach has demonstrated greater model resilience than undefended classifiers, however there are a few shortcomings to this approach: 1) it is difficult to scale to classifiers that process high resolution inputs like ImageNet [16] , 2) adversarial training based on weak attacks does not provide an adequate defense against stronger attacks [1] , and 3) it is fairly easy to construct effective adversarial examples against a network that has already been trained to cope with some adversarial examples [19] .
2) Defensive Distillation
Distillation refers to the process of training one network using the softmax outputs of another network. Originally, this process was aimed at reducing the computational resources required for using a neural network. Hence, the distilled network included a considerably lower number of neurons.
Defensive distillation [26] enhances the basic distillation process in order to increase the resilience of the classifier network against adversarial examples. In this case, the two networks share a common size and architecture, however the distilled network is trained using a high distillation temperature. The softmax calculation is modified to divide both the numerator and the denominator by the distillation temperature as follows:
With a temperature of one (6) reverts back to the standard softmax function. As the distillation temperature increases, the value of becomes larger than , hence the softmax output approaches 1/N (with N denoting the number of classes). Training the distilled network using high temperature values forces it to increase the softmax input for the most probable class compared to the others. Informally, we say that the classifier is required to be more certain about its classification output, making it more resilient to adversarial perturbations. Defensive distillation has proved to be effective against multiple attack methods, but it is still unable to overcome adversarial examples constructed using the C&W attack.
3) Gradient Obfuscation
As attack methods are commonly based on calculating the loss gradient, one might want to prevent this calculation to increase model robustness. The term gradient obfuscation [24] refers to any attempt to prevent the gradient calculation, distort the gradient result, or eliminate the gradient altogether. Gradient obfuscation is considered a mandatory requirement, albeit an insufficient one [3] , for any defense or detection mechanism. As long as the defense or detection mechanism is based on some differentiable function, an adversary can successfully attack both the classifier and defense models. This is done by treating the two models as a single, combined unit and computing adversarial perturbations that fool them both [7] . Therefore, obfuscation aims to prevent such attacks.
Notable examples of obfuscation use generative adversarial networks (GANs) in an attempt to remove adversarial noise [12] , [18] , [30] , [29] . Those methods are based on the assumption that no adversarial examples exist within the generator's manifold. However, in a recent work [3] the authors were able to overcome this line of defense as well.
C. Detecting Adversarial Examples
Various attempts to detect adversarial examples based on statistical properties of the input have been suggested in recent years [34] . In these studies, the authors used various statistical tests and dimensionality reduction approaches in order to differentiate adversarial examples from normal input. However, as shown in [7] , all of these approaches failed to effectively detect state of the art attacks.
Relatively little research used the output of inner layers of the classifier network in order to detect and defend against adversarial examples. In [35] , the authors constructed SVM classifiers trained to detect adversarial examples based on the outputs of each of the network's inner layers. However, this defense method resulted in a very high false positive rate when tested against the C&W attack [7] .
The authors of [36] augmented the classifier network with a secondary detector network that is fed by the output of the classifier's convolution layers. However, given that the detector network is differentiable, more recent research [7] demonstrated that it is possible to form adversarial examples that simultaneously fool both the classifier and the detector.
In a recent work [17] , the authors attempted to resolve the false certainty issue. They constructed a set of k-NN classifiers based on the output of inner convolution layers. Then, for a given input, collected the combined list of neighbors for all k-NN classifiers and used this list in order to calculate a more accurate confidence score. High class variance within this list was translated to low confidence scores and vice versa. This work differs from our approach in two key respects: 1) The authors did not construct a detector. Instead their goal was to reduce the classifier's reported certainty level when faced with adversarial input. 2) This work treats the outputs of all inner layers as a single monolithic block. Our approach analyzes the "spatial movements" of adversarial examples between one layer and another. We leverage the individual class labels derived from each of the layers to form classification sequences and show that the adversarial "movement patterns" reflected in those sequences are far less likely than normal movement patterns.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In this section, we describe our proposed method for detecting adversarial examples. We provide implementation details and evaluation results using image classification and convolution-based classifiers, however we believe the same principles can be easily adapted to other domains as well.
Our proposed solution is based on the abstraction of the activation space, a term we coined to denote the hyperspace formed by the activation values of a given neural network layer.
A. Notation and Terminology
Building on the notation defined in Section II.A, we denote (•) as the output of the i 
B. Intuition and Motivation
Assuming that our neural network classifier is accurate enough, input is usually mapped to its correct class label by the final softmax layer. Using the activation space abstraction, we say that input is mapped into distinctive clusters within (the activation space of the last layer).
Natively class-based separation doesn't usually exist within the input space. The role of the first group of neural network layers is therefore to differentiate between classes by mapping input into a high dimensionality space, so that instances of the same class are clustered together. With normal input, once separation has been achieved, the final layers of the network reduce dimensionality while preserving class-based separation.
Adversarial examples are designed to closely resemble normal input but cause the classifier to assign them an incorrect class label. Within the activation spaces of the lower network layers, we therefore expect adversarial examples to appear close to normal instances of their source class. Similarly, we expect them to be in proximity to instances of some other class in the activation spaces of the last set of network layers. This is especially true in the case of the C&W attack due to the small perturbation distances it produces.
In this way, we can expect different spatial behavior across various activation spaces when comparing normal and adversarial examples, and our proposed method is based on this line of thought. We track the process of class separation through the analysis of activation spaces and identify spatial patterns that differentiate adversarial examples from normal input.
C. Detector Training
The following section provides the implementation details for our detector. A pseudocode for the detector training process is provided in Algorithm 1.
Constructing Activation Spaces: During detector training, we construct a baseline for modeling the behavior of normal examples within the activation spaces. We allocate half of our training set for modeling the behavior of normal, unperturbed inputs (note that the input samples used for training the detector were not used for training the classifier). We feed the inputs into the network and compute the activation values of each convolution layer. We then construct a Euclidian activation space for each layer by projecting layer activation output using principal component analysis (PCA). In this case, PCA serves a dual purpose: 1) it reduces dimensionality and, in doing so, removes correlated outputs, and 2) it forms a Euclidian hyperspace where axes are perpendicular to one another, allowing distance calculations.
Training a Dedicated k-NN Classifier for Each Activation Space: Next, we train a dedicated k-NN classifier for each activation space, mapping points of each space into one of the network's class labels. There are several reasons for using k-NN in our case: a) it is a non-differentiable algorithm, hence providing us with the gradient obfuscation needed to block simple, gradient-based attacks against our detector, b) it directly refers to the Euclidian distance within they hyperspace of observations, and c) it has only a marginal effect on training complexity. Indeed, k-NN's inference complexity increases together with its input dimensionality. However, given that we used PCA to reduce the dimensionality of our activation spaces, this potential pitfall is mitigated.
Estimating A Priori Class Label Switching Probability: Based on the trained k-NN classifiers, we assign each input sample with a sequence of class labels (one label per classifier) and further use those sequences for estimating the a priori probability for a class label change between each pair of subsequent convolution layers. Intuitively one can expect this a priori probability to be relatively high within the first activation spaces and to gradually decrease towards the later activation spaces. This is a result of the improvement in class separation as we move from one network layer to another. We can also expect adversarial examples to demonstrate label switching patterns that are substantially different than those of normal examples. Our experiments provide empirical evidence to support that intuition.
Computing the Log Likelihood of Class Label Sequences: Given the a priori label switching probability estimates, we can compute the log likelihood of a given sequence. When calculating likelihood values, we follow the naïve Bayes principle and assume that the predictions made by our k-NN classifiers are independent of one another. This allows us to calculate the likelihood of the label switching sequences as the product of individual probabilities. However, the deeper the neural network is, the longer the classification sequence, causing the computation to quickly exhaust the accuracy limit of floating point calculations. We overcome this computational limitation by computing the log likelihood (the sum of probability logs) instead of the product.
We perturb the remaining half of the training set, thereby creating adversarial examples, feed the adversarial examples into the network, calculate the corresponding activation values, and assign each adversarial example a sequence of class labels as we did for the normal examples. Using the a priori class label switching probability estimates, we calculate the log likelihood of each normal and adversarial sequence and choose a cutoff value to differentiate between the groups.
Hyperparameter Optimization:
• The number of PCA components used when forming the Euclidian activation spaces affects detector accuracy. The results reported in the following section are based on using the first 100 PCA components. The number of components was determined through trial and error. For layers with fewer output neurons, we maintain the original dimensionality but use PCA to form Euclidian spaces.
• Our experiments indicate that the number of neighbors used to train the k-NN classifiers does not have a major effect on detector accuracy. We therefore report accuracy results using five nearest neighbors (k=5).
D. Detector Evaluation
Once the detector has been trained, evaluation is straightforward. We feed each new set of input images into the neural network classifier and compute the activation values for each convolution layer. We use the trained k-NN classifiers to produce a sequence of class labels, compute the log likelihood of the observed class switches between activation spaces, and ultimately apply the cutoff value computed during training to determine whether the sample is adversarial or not. The pseudocode for the detector evaluation is provided in Algorithm 2.
E. Evaluation Framework
We conduct our experiments using the Python ecosystem. We use Keras with a TensorFlow backend as our deep learning framework and the CleverHans [22] library for crafting adversarial perturbations. We test our proposed method using two benchmark datasets -the MNIST handwritten digits [17] and CIFAR-10 image classification [14] datasets, as summarized in TABLE I. For MNIST classification, we use the simple CNN described in [13] . This classifier network includes six layers and roughly 1.2M trainable parameters, and achieves 99.1% accuracy for the unperturbed testing set. For CIFAR-10, we use a VGG16 network adjusted from [8] . This network includes 34 layers, accounting for roughly 15M trainable parameters, and achieves 93.6% accuracy.
IV. RESULTS AND EVALUATION
A. Evaluation Based on the MNIST Dataset
We follow the steps described in Section III.C, in order to test the validity of our approach using the MNIST dataset. We train the CNN on the predefined training set and use half of the testing samples for training our detector.
We then form adversarial examples based on the remaining half of the testing samples, using the C&W attack method [6] . A random target class is chosen for each input image. Fig. 1 . Results using the MNIST dataset. Top -class switching probability for normal and adversarial input; bottom -log likelihood of class switching sequences.
TABLE II lists the attack hyper parameters used in our experiments which are similar to the ones used in previous works. Using those parameters, we were able to manipulate the classification of all input samples to our randomly selected target class. We start by assessing our intuition with regard to the a priori label switching probability. As shown in Fig. 1 , the probabilities seem to support our intuition. However, MNIST presents a rather simple classification task. This is apparent by the relatively low switching probability for the first layers, as well as by this simple model's nearly perfect classification results.
With our intuition affirmed, we move on to calculating the log likelihood of class switching for normal and adversarial examples. As is clear from Fig. 1 , the likelihood of the adversarial switching sequences is considerably lower than that of normal sequences. This is a result of the inherent nature of 
The last step for constructing the detector is choosing a likelihood threshold value. This is done by plotting an ROC curve and choosing the desired ratio of false positive vs. false negative classification.
B. Evaluation Based on the CIFAR-10 Dataset
The MNIST dataset provides insufficient empirical support to our approach due to its simplicity [7] . Some defense mechanisms were shown to be effective in blocking/detecting adversarial perturbations against the MNIST dataset but failed when applied to more complex use cases. Therefore, we repeated the experiment using the CIFAR-10 dataset. The increased complexity of the CIFAR-10 classification task is reflected in the much deeper architecture of the CNN required to solve it and by the fact that over 10 times more trainable parameters are used in this case. As in the case of MNIST, we used a randomly selected target for each input sample. The C&W attack parameters utilized are listed in TABLE II. A much stronger attack configuration was required in this case in order to ensure that 100% of the samples are manipulated to our selected target class. Specifically, we used a lower learning rate and a larger number of iterations compared to the MNIST case. Parameters were chosen by gradually increasing the attack strength until all input was successfully perturbed to its target class, hence balancing perturbation success against attack complexity.
As a first step in our analysis, we provide a visual analysis of the expressive power of activation spaces. We projected each of the activation spaces of the CIFAR-10 classifier network onto a 2D plot using t-Distributed Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE) [38] . t-SNE is an unsupervised dimensionality reduction method that is particularly suitable for visualizing high dimensional datasets. This method attempts to preserve, within the projected visualization, the relative distance between each data point and its neighbors. As a result, the distance between every two data points on the t-SNE visualization is correlative to the distance in the original dataset. It should be noted, however, that the absolute position within the visualization is meaningless. Fig. 4 includes the t-SNE visualization of every eighth activation space in the CIFAR-10 classifier. The colors represent different true class labels. Notably, the true class labels are only used for visualization and are not available to the t-SNE algorithm. The gradual increase in class separation is clearly evident, starting with an intertwined mixture of colors in the visualization of the first activation space and ending with distinctive colored areas in the visualization of the last activation space.
Testing the correlation between the calculated log likelihood and the perturbation norm showed they are practically independent of one another (0.009 Pearson correlation). This serves as evidence that our detector is based on an inherent quality of adversarial examples, as opposed to some visual artifact.
Next, we tested our detector's performance using the CIFAR-10 dataset. Fig. 2 presents the results of this experiment. As anticipated, a priori label switching probability decreases towards the last layers of the network. In contrast, adversarial switching probability remains much higher through most of the network's layers. Those vastly different switching patterns yield substantially lower log likelihood values for the adversarial examples. 
C. Testing with Additional Attack Methods
In an attempt to form a holistic multi-purpose defense mechanism, we repeated the experiment described in IV.B using the JSMA, FGSM, and BIM attack methods. Detection accuracy for JSMA was equivalent to that of C&W. However, for FGSM and BIM our detector obtained an AUC of ~0.84. While this is far from random, the levels of false positive detection were too high to allow the use of our detector as is.
Leveraging the independence of the detector model of the underlying classifier network, we augmented our detector by applying defensive distillation and repeated the experiment. As was expected, distillation effectively prevented FGSM and BIM attacks, and our detector successfully identified C&W based perturbations. This experiment demonstrates the importance of detaching the detection algorithm from the classifier model. Namely, it allows different defense methods to be combined. By that, we demonstrate the potential value of ensemble-based defense approaches.
D. Analyzing False Positive Examples and Choosing a
Likelihood Threshold Value Following the experiment described in Section IV.C, an in depth investigation of the false positive cases revealed that such cases are largely associated with cases of misclassification by the original classifier network. Whereas on average our network provides incorrect classification for 6.3% of all examples, the network misclassifies roughly 30-40% of all false positive examples (depending on the cutoff value). We see that incorrectly classified images exhibit a high rate of label fluctuations through the last layers of the network, similar to adversarial examples. This further strengthens our understanding of the role played by the different layers of the deep neural network (DNN). Replotting the ROC using only correctly classified examples shows an impressive AUC of 0.97. Fig. 3 presents the detector's ROC curve for the complete testing set, as well as when filtering for correctly classified examples.
V. SUMMARY
In this work, we present a novel method for detecting adversarial perturbations based on activation spaces, the hyperspaces formed by the activation outputs of the network's inner layers. We designed our detector based on the inherent nature of adversarial examples. Our proposed detector leverages a set of k-NN classifiers trained on the activation outputs of each layer of a neural network. We measure the a priori probability of class label changes between every two consecutive layers and use this set of probabilities to compute the likelihood of the entire classification sequence. The k-NN classification algorithm is non-differentiable, hence preventing simple gradient-based attacks against our detector model. From a computational point of view, our detector adds relatively little overhead to both training and inference. Training time is increased by roughly 10% and inference time is practically unchanged.
On its own, our approach proves to be highly effective against the state of the art C&W attack [6] , achieving an AUC of 0.97 using the CIFAR-10 dataset. To the best of our knowledge all prior attempts at detecting C&W based perturbations were defeated so far [7] .
By augmenting our method with defensive distillation, we form a multi-purpose defense mechanism capable of defeating a wide range of attacks. By that, we demonstrate the potential value of ensemble-based defense approaches.
We hypothesized that DNN classifiers begin by clustering input samples in a high dimensional space and then reduce representation dimensionality towards the final layer, while preserving class separation. Our experiments support this intuition in two ways: 1) the a priori label changing probability decreases asymptotically towards the final layers of the network, and 2) false positive detection is tightly coupled with classification accuracy. Normal inputs that are misclassified by the original neural network are very likely to trigger a false positive classification by our detector model. In the future, we plan to extend our approach to include additional network types, such as recurrent neural networks (RNNs), by leveraging the CNN to RNN transferability. We would like to explore ways of using an all DNN implementation of our detector. We also plan to continue to explore the nature of adversarial examples in different content domains with various classifier architectures.
